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CAROLYN KORSMEYER(University at Buffalo)
GUT APPRECIATION:
POSSIBILITIES FOR AESTHETIC DISGUST
I first became interested in the emotion of disgust in the 1990s, justas it was becoming a trendy topic for discussion in psychology andphilosophy of art1. At that time, the legacy of thinking on the topicwas relatively scanty. Disgust was still under-analyzed, frequentlypresumed to be not only a ‘basic’ emotion but also a rather simpleone, a kind of sensory automatic recoil that operates in an all-or-nothing fashion to keep us away from polluted or toxic substances. Assuch, it didn’t appear to be an emotion capable of conveying very in-teresting or profound meanings. Given its primary – and even per-haps exclusive – function as a warning signal to avoid contaminants,this emotion appeared to be more reactive than ruminative. Fromthis perspective, disgust would seem to have a limited role to play inart, whose products include complex phenomena demanding subtleinterpretation. Moreover, this approach would surely imply consi-derable difficulty in assigning disgust a positively valenced role inappreciation.With a couple of exceptions among theorists interested in hor-ror2, philosophical perspectives on disgust still reflected the viewsperpetuated by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Lessing,who held that alone among emotions disgust could not be aroused byart and still provide aesthetic appeal3. Yet at the same time, the
1 This paper is revised from a presentation at the Eastern Division of the American Societyfor Aesthetics in April, 2013. I thank the audience and my co-panelists, Greg Horowitz andWilliam Davis, for their helpful comments.2 Such as N. Carroll, The philosophy of horror, New York, Routledge, 1990 and C. Freeland, The
naked and the undead, Boulder, Westview Press, 2000.3 The eighteenth-century literature on this thesis is extensively analyzed by W. Menninghaus,
Disgust: theory and history of a strong sensation, trans. by H. Eiland - J. Garb, Albany, StateUniversity of New York Press, 2003.
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worlds of art and entertainment were exploiting this emotion withunprecedented verve – depicting and arousing disgust with all thedevices available to their mediums. Artworks have always deployeddisgust with images and descriptions of mutilations, rot, bodilywastes, and gore in the course of propelling plots or enhancing depic-tions, often to convey a sense of mortality, human frailty, or sin.Moreover, much art of the last decades includes many works that ap-pear to be aimed at the arousal of disgust as the primary purpose orend of a creative work4. The social and cultural meaning of this latterphenomenon is worthy of a study of its own, though I shall not ad-dress it here. Rather, I want to investigate a particular aspect of thesort of aesthetic satisfaction that disgust can deliver when it isaroused by works of art.Disgust no longer stands at the sidelines of research investigat-ing human emotions. Among artists, philosophers, psychologists, andneurobiologists, interest in disgust has burgeoned markedly in thelast two decades, and theorists from all of these fields have providedinsights about the nature of this emotion in and out of the worlds ofart. Most markedly, especially among philosophers and others whowrite in the humanities, disgust no longer appears to be a simpleemotion at all. Indeed, its affective tone and the meanings it can con-vey are recognized to be varied and complex. The satisfactions thatdisgust delivers when deftly deployed in art attain a valence that canbe hard to analyze. In particular, whether or not disgust aroused byart can itself be a zone of pleasure, enjoyment, or positive responseremains an issue that continues to be under debate. It is this latteraspect of the disgusting that I shall investigate in this essay.In the book Savoring disgust (2011) I sought to understand howan emotion characterized by strong and unpleasant physiological re-vulsion could function as an aesthetic emotion, by which I meant amode of apprehension and appreciation of certain kinds of art. Hereis a working definition of aesthetic disgust: «The arousal of disgust inan audience, a spectator, or a reader, under circumstances where thatemotion both apprehends artistic properties and constitutes a com-
4 C. Talon-Hugon, Goȗt et dégoȗt: l’art peut-il tout montrer?, Nîmes, Éditions JacquelineChambon, 2003.
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ponent of appreciation»5. Arousal of emotion in an appreciative modecould describe any emotion aesthetically employed, of course. Thril-lers and horror narratives deliberately arouse fear and anxiety; sto-ries with social import may evoke indignation, resentment, or sympa-thy. Images and texts prompt one to feel sorrow, affection, surprise,and amusement, and of course there are many works that play withthe emotions and responses that mark erotic affects and effects. Inshort, the actual arousal – in addition to the depiction or portrayal –of emotions is pervasive in virtually all art forms. However, the deli-berate arousal of disgust as a mode of appreciation raises especiallyvivid puzzles because of this emotion’s strongly aversive character.And despite the undeniable presence of disgust both depicted andaroused by compelling works of art, its aesthetic appeal remains puz-zling. As one scientific researcher remarked two decades ago: «Itwould be difficult to generate approach tendencies toward an objectthat elicits disgust»6. And yet art compels attention and invites justsuch an approach tendency. A more recent comment from a philoso-pher reasserts a contemporary version of the older caution: «Artmust attract the senses; it cannot repel them»7. Evidently, the dep-loyment of disgust in works of art continues to invite investigation.Disgust is a physically uncomfortable emotion, arousing disa-greeable visceral sensations ranging from skin-crawling queasinessto outright nausea. Its objects are not noble, as might be those of oth-er taxing emotions such as fear or anger. The intentional objects ofdisgust are lowly, base, stinking, slimy, and contaminating, and theyinclude bodily waste products, decaying organic matter, gore and mu-tilation, corpses, and vermin. All of these elements may be found inart, and they often offend and revolt audiences. Sometimes whensuch matters are the subject-matter of art, the audience is alsoamused, curious, or sympathetic. That is, the presence of disgustingcontent does not entail a wholesale disgust-reaction on the part of aviewer or reader, and sometimes disgust is erased by representation-al features that amuse or interest. As Aristotle remarked more than
5 C. Korsmeyer, Savoring disgust: the foul and the fair in aesthetics, New York, Oxford Univer-sity Press, 2011, p. 88.6 R.J. Davidson, Complexities in the search for emotion-specific physiology, in P. Ekman - R.J.Davidson (eds.), The nature of emotion, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 239.7 C. McGinn, The meaning of disgust, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 200.
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two millennia ago, even a rotting corpse, if deftly rendered in mimeticform, may become an object of pleasurable learning.The tough problem arises when the viewer or reader not onlyrecognizes the disgusting character of depicted objects and events,but is also really disgusted. That is, when the emotion is actuallyaroused in the course of apprehending the work. As such, disgust canplay at least two roles. In some cases, one simply rejects a work anddeems it too nasty for appreciation. This verdictive reaction marks anaesthetic judgment of sorts, but disgust is not functioning apprecia-tively in this case; therefore, I would not label this response a case ofaesthetic disgust. However, there is a more significant role the emo-tion can play when it is evoked, namely, when it is aroused as part offull understanding and appreciation of a work. In these cases, disgustcertainly counts among the responses that Bernard Bosanquet cha-racterizes as involving «difficult» artistic qualities, those that requirethe «capacity to endure and enjoy feeling at high tension»8. There arelots of uncomfortable, high-tension emotions, fear, dread, and sorrowamong them. But one might question whether the capacity to enduredisgust is worth the outcome. What can disgust offer us to induce ourwilling participation? Given the endemic negativity and aversivenessof this emotion, we may well ask: how can the reaction of disgust re-main intact – that is to say, with no change in the identity of the emo-tion – and still be part of a positive aesthetic experience?Many schools of thought analyze ‘positive’ aesthetic responsesas brands of pleasure, a theoretical approach underwritten by thefounding philosophies of aesthetics in the European Enlightenment9.I am suspicious about the usefulness of the language of pleasure todiagnose aesthetic disgust, and I side with those thinkers who arguethat satisfaction from art is far more complex than hedonic terminol-ogy is able to capture10. At the same time, I do not believe that disgustalways utterly repels when it is aroused by works of art. Often it does,
8 B. Bosanquet, Three lectures on aesthetic, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963, p. 48.9 Some current psychological research uses the more neutral term ‘valence’, but valence it-self is parsed in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness. See, e.g. A. Kron et al, How are you
feeling? Revisiting the quantification of emotional qualia, «Psychological Science» 20 (2013),10, pp. 1-9.10 E.g. J. Levinson, The pleasures of aesthetics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 18-20.
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of course; disgust does not operate the same way in every case, andthere are many works that arouse disgust to convey a point so painfulthat ‘enjoying’ the disgust response would be wrongheaded and per-verse. But is this always the case? Are there no artistic examples thatarouse disgust in a way that is actually relished, even enjoyed? Thetitle term I selected for this essay – Gut appreciation – does not in-voke pleasure but still connotes a type of attraction or appeal, sug-gesting the idea of ‘savoring’ the affect engendered by a work. Thegustatory connotation is deliberate. Disgust is a highly sensory emo-tion, and one of the senses that it centrally engages is taste11 (in cer-tain languages ‘disgusting’ connotes the opposite of ‘tasty’). There-fore, prima facie it appears to be impossible – or at least paradoxical –to savor something that disgusts. Nonetheless, within the worlds ofart, I believe that, no matter how uncomfortable the experience, aes-thetic disgust can rivet attention to the point where one actually maybe said to savor the feeling.To appreciate this possibility, we need to recognize that bothdisgusting content and affective responses come in many varieties.When we think of art that disgusts, the first examples that come tomind are probably the maggoty corpses in Damien Hirst’s vitrines; orthe stomach-turning murders, autopsies, mutilations and degrada-tions that are often presented on television and in film. But I amequally interested in the more restrained and subtle disturbancesthat mark appreciation, such as the cringe occasioned by the bladebeginning to cut skin from muscle in Titian’s Flaying of Marsyas or Sa-turn’s teeth tearing the tender flesh of his infant child in Rubens’ ren-dition of that story. Disgusting objects present huge variety whenthey are rendered in complex works of art, including lengthy narra-tive works in which disgusting images and events occur intermittent-ly or steadily throughout the development of plot. Relatedly, the feel-ing of disgust admits many degrees, and the extent to which one can
11 See W.I. Miller, The anatomy of disgust, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997. Oralincorporation of a revolting object is one of the paradigm images of disgust. Charles Darwinis an early thinker who analyzed the sense of taste as central to the arousal of disgust, thoughothers select smell or touch. Also one of the early psychological studies of disgust assertsthat «the main threat against which disgust is directed, is the oral incorporation of certainsubstances» (A. Angyal, Disgust and related aversions, «Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy-chology» 36 (1941), p. 394).
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reasonably ‘savor’ the experience varies, although I do not think thatsavoring is merely a function of intensity. Rather, in artistic contexts,it is more a matter of fit between the affect aroused in an audienceand the meaning conveyed by a work. Sometimes that fit requiresdisgust to be aroused in such a painful way that the reader or vieweror audience shudders and turns away, as with war narratives or hor-ror or sometimes tragedy. Other times, one may be invited to inhabitthe feeling at greater length, as with comedy. Still other times the deftdepiction of a disgusting object is admired, either at the same timethat disgust is aroused or as a constituent of the affective response. Inthose cases, one may gaze protractedly at an image or read lines overand over, savoring the repulsion they arouse.Further complication is provided by the fact that emotions veryrarely appear singly but usually come packaged with other states:fear, tension, anxiety, excitement, dread, sorrow, surprise, amuse-ment. The possibilities are multiple, and the combinations often makesingling out the valence of disgust by itself indeterminate. With manyof these combinations, disgust certainly remains entirely aversive,just as it is supposed to be in so-called real life. But with some, dis-gust with all its discomforts can assume a more inviting form, an in-triguingly paradoxical situation that is both an issue for contempo-rary art and culture and an entry into the lists of an ancient puzzle.Let us review that puzzle as a ground for examining the satisfactionsof disgust in art.
1. Paradoxes of aversionWith all the attention it has garnered in the last two decades, disgustnow sits firmly in the company of the difficult emotions that arecounted as aversions in real life and yet exert an appeal in works ofart, contributing crucially to the way they deliver insights about cru-elty, corporeal nature, mortality, life, death. As such, the task of inves-tigating disgust involves a version of the ancient paradox of tragedyaddressed by Aristotle in the Poetics: the phenomenon of a supposed-ly painful emotional event being valued and sought after as if it werepleasant. In order to avoid as much as possible the distracting impli-cations of hedonic terminology (which tends to presume that plea-sure is the common denominator that underlies all positive evalua-tive experiences), I offer the paradox in these terms: how can a feel-
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ing that standardly operates as an aversion become an attraction? Orto extend the gustatory language, how can the distasteful come to besavored? Some still say it simply cannot; others suggest ways that itcan. Among the reasons advanced why the arousal of disgust cannotin principle occasion satisfaction or savoring, is the thesis that dis-gusting content, if artistically successful, transforms into somethingelse in the artistic rendition. Perhaps it is grotesque or even ugly, butit loses the distinctive revulsion of disgust. This is essentially the po-sition maintained by Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Kant, who arguedthat when disgusting content is rendered in art – that is, when it isrendered successfully and without compromise of aesthetic liking –the qualities of art that would be disgusting in nature are now gro-tesque, tragic, even ugly12. In these successful cases, the emotion ofdisgust is not itself experienced by the perceiver, for disgust remainsthe emotion that cannot be aroused in an aesthetically positive man-ner. Only a few theorists still explicitly adhere to this view, for it ap-pears antiquated and squeamish, though there are some contempo-rary comments that lean in that direction. Moreover, I suspect that asimilar sensibility lies behind some persistent hesitation about howto deal with negative emotions in art that I shall return to shortly.A second approach to the paradox posits that when disgustaroused by art becomes a positive experience (in other words, be-comes something that might be called savorable), there are in facttwo affective phenomena with competing valences at work: the dis-gust (which remains negative) and something else, perhaps amuse-ment, or perhaps an insight that so depends on the accompanyingdisgust that the experience as a whole is valued positively. This is theso-called coexistentialist position, which holds that the knowledgegained from difficult subjects is sufficiently pleasurable that we putup with the negative path that leads to it13. Both of these positionsimply that disgust always retains an intractably negative, painful, un-pleasant, unsavorable tenor.
12 For a discussion of the complexities and nuances of their views, see M. Mazzocut-Mis, How
far can we go? Pain, excess and the obscene, trans. by. J. Coggan, Newcastle, Cambridge Scho-lars Publishing, 2012, especially ch. 2.13 G. Iseminger, How strange a sadness, «Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism» 42 (1983).
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Apologists for the disgusting, however, sometimes argue thatdisgust can become a positive response inasmuch as we can be grati-fied by the fact that we can tolerate the appropriate arousal of diffi-cult emotions, including those that are discomforting and painful.This is a metatheoretical position that acknowledges the difficulty ofexperiencing certain sorts of art, but also posits a reason why that dif-ficulty is valued. It is not that the disgust (or other aversion) itself be-comes savored, but rather the fact that it is tolerated as a part of ar-tistic understanding becomes itself an object of satisfaction14.Finally – and this is the position I explore here – there areworks of art that arouse disgust in a way that induces one willingly todwell in the emotion itself, such that one would prefer to remain inthe thrall of disgust rather than to remove oneself. (Sometimes this istermed an ‘integrationist’ account because it does not sequester theaversion from appreciative response.) This position needs to be care-fully distinguished from the first, because it maintains that the appre-ciative affect so produced retains its identity as disgust but shifts va-lence so that it can be, not necessarily pleasurable, but savorable. ButI would stress that all three other diagnoses and their many varia-tions also have confirming examples. There is by no means one andonly one mode that disgust assumes in its aesthetic roles. It is appro-priate to the heterogeneity of the objects of disgust and to their vari-ous deployments in works of art that we need more than one over-arching explanation to solve the so-called paradox of aversion. As faras I can judge from the literature, the really controversial position isthe last, the one that grants that the feeling of disgust can itself be sa-vored. And given the characteristically aversive nature of disgust, thisthesis indeed presents a thorny problem.This may seem a small point to haggle over. There are manyother questions about the roles of disgust in art, including why thereis so much of it around these days and just whether there are limits tobe reached with art that involves this uncomfortable emotion.Whether or not disgust accompanies or constitutes aesthetic savoringmay seem rather academic and picky. However, there is actually quitea lot at stake in the issue. People working in aesthetics are obviouslyinterested in the nature of appreciation and the modes by which the
14 S. Feagin, The pleasures of tragedy, «American Philosophical Quarterly» 20 (1983).
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meanings of artworks are apprehended. Moreover, this question alsodrives some controversies in emotion theory, an area that still har-bors many mysteries.
2. Emotions general and aestheticOne widely-accepted approach to emotions regards them as distinc-tive responses that are appropriately aroused by a set of elicitors thatmanifest suitable determinate properties. This picture assumes thatthe repertoire of human emotions has developed because these res-ponses register qualities of objects and events that are not readilyrecognized by any other means. If you cannot feel fear, you also donot know what is dangerous, for example. If your reactions of angerare limited, you may overlook injustices (as Aristotle observed). Thatis, emotions are designed to pick out value qualities in the worldaround. This very cogent picture, which is adopted by phenomenolo-gists and analytic philosophers alike, as well as by psychologists, islikely to lead one to assume that each emotion has a fairly stablequale, a typical ‘feel’ that is induced by a suitable range of objects andprompts appropriate behavior. That is, an emotion is conceived as atype of mental state that goes on the alert when it senses one of itsproper targets. As such, emotions have motivating force: the pleasantones induce action towards retaining an object; the unpleasant onesinduce retreat, revolt, rejection. While this is a sound way to thinkabout the general function of emotions, this model makes it extreme-ly difficult to explain how one might savor a difficult, unpleasant af-fective experience such as disgust, whose typical manifestation re-jects its objects.What is more, apart from noting general valence and motivatingfunction, the above approach does not attend in any detailed way towhat we might call the phenomenology of emotions – how they feelwhen aroused. Theorists often avoid trying to describe the zone offeeling in great detail because it appears to be so indeterminate andhard to pin down, and because analysis is so peculiarly reliant on in-trospection. However, since the quality of affective response is centerstage when considering emotions aroused by art, understanding feel-ing is unavoidable in aesthetics. While psychological experimentsthat test for affective response employ relatively simple stimuli (im-ages, descriptions), works of art are highly complicated, inviting as
195 Lebenswelt, 3 (2013)
they do the reflective pondering of appreciative audiences, as well asexpert critics and reviewers. The multiple interpretations that workssustain invite disparate emotive responses, again further muddlinggeneral assessments of the responses of disgust to art. We need atleast to reach the point where reports on introspection achieve thelevel of communication that happens with good criticism, where oneperson assesses his or her responses to a work and articulates themfor others. However, the problem at hand is trickier than with criti-cism, for when assessing a work of art, critic and audience are talkingabout the same publically observable object. But asking about the va-lence attached to the disgust response itself is not so public. Let’s see– was that one feeling going on inside me (evidence for integration-ism), or two (add to the arsenal of coextentialism)? How do we tell?Given the current popularity of neuroimaging, it might betempting to hook up a machine and count the places in the brain thatlight up in an fMRI, but I doubt this is a useful route to an answer.There are lots of things that go on in our brains all the time; certainlymore than two. Suppose that the anterior insular cortex, an area cor-related with disgust experiences, shows activity, and so does one ofthe parts of the brain correlated with pleasure. Could we determine ifthe pleasure is a distinct experience traveling alongside disgust?What if the intentional object of the pleasure is the disgust itself ra-ther than the object that triggered it? This kind of experiment mightproduce interesting data, but I don’t see how it can settle the matterat hand. In fact, we face an ineluctably experiential, phenomenologi-cal question. This makes it all the more troublesome, for as DanielKelly points out in his recent book, Yuck, «the qualitative aspect ofany mental state or process is notoriously difficult to pin down withempirical data or the resources of functionalism»15. But it is the qua-litative aspect of this state that is crucial for the problem at hand, sowe need to pursue it. For better or for worse, at some point we prob-ably must revert to introspection to try to sort through these matters,asking ourselves: can I think of cases where I have lingered over dis-gusting scenes, descriptions, images, and dwelt within them with anattention akin to relish or savor?
15 D. Kelly, Yuck: the nature and moral significance of disgust, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2011, p.153, n. 3.
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A useful guide to pursuing this question is found in the reflec-tions of the Hungarian philosopher Aurel Kolnai. Writing well beforethe advent of recent interest in disgust, Kolnai extensively investi-gated the varieties of material and moral disgust, and included in hisdetailed catalog are some observations about the qualitative feelingsthat characterize this emotion16. While he classifies disgust as a modeof aversion, he also recognizes what he calls its aesthetic aspect. Kol-nai did not have aesthetics as a discipline in mind, nor was he think-ing about art. Rather, he was calling attention to the propensity ofthis emotion to induce the subject to focus upon the presentationalqualities of disgusting objects. Kolnai argues that the ‘structure’ ofdisgust contains a built-in aesthetic dimension made possible by thefact that disgust prompts attention to the qualities of the presentationof an object over and above the fact of its existence17. Consequently,when aroused, disgust manifests a pause during which one takes inthe sensory properties of the revolting object. In contrast to fear,which is apt to induce rapid flight from the fearsome object, disgustprovides opportunity for a second look. Since disgusting things arenot immediately threatening, we have the leisure to take in theirqualities and marvel at their appearance. One could object to thischaracterization, for disgusting objects certainly can be dangerousinasmuch as they are vectors for disease, but the point is that Kolnairecognized in the very structure of disgust an opportunity, a psycho-logical space, for dwelling on the emotional experience. I see this asan opening to consider the possibilities of relishing, savoring, even attimes enjoying the experience of disgust when it is aroused by art.I pursue this point by zeroing in on just one aspect of the feelingof disgust: nausea, selected for its undeniable physical unpleasant-ness. Nausea is not the same as disgust, and one can be nauseatedwithout being disgusted, as when suffering from food poisoning. Nau-sea is not itself an emotion, but it is one of the typical palpable signalsof disgust, and many works provoke the feeling on purpose18. There-fore, it would seem that this aspect of disgust would never invite sa-
16 A. Kolnai, On disgust, ed. by B. Smith - C. Korsmeyer, Chicago, Open Court, 2004.17 There is an echo here of Kant’s first moment of beauty, wherein the subject has no interestin the existence of an object but only in its presentational form.18 Kelly notes that the disgust response includes many physiological concomitants of nausea,both of which are correlated with activities in the so-called gustatory cortex.
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voring; indeed, it would seem to be the very opposite of appreciativeresponse. I am deliberately setting myself a difficult case by consider-ing works that are nausea-inducing, but I believe that there are someexamples that indicate the affective range of even this somatic re-sponse. And if such a case can be made for this highly unpleasantphysical upheaval, it would open the way for granting aestheticstanding to the more complex emotion of disgust as a savorable, ap-preciative affect.Sometimes nausea is simply a response to sensory disturbance.This can occur with the effects that some movies produce, as with jig-gling hand-held cameras (for instance, Rachel getting married); orwith special effects, such as the heaving waves of The life of Pi, winnerof four Academy Awards, including Best Visual Effects (I myself spentabout an hour in the theater feeling quite seasick). I would classifysuch visceral response as merely the result of sensory overload.Here is a slightly more positive example: Sebastian Junger’sbook, The perfect storm, also made into a movie. (I choose the proserather than the movie, because prose is by nature a less manipulativemedium). I read this book with intense fascination, and at one pointof especially rapt reading, I discovered that my living room was tilt-ing. I had to put the book down for a while and let my dizziness sub-side. It was not pleasant at all, and I did not savor the feeling, but Iwas full of admiration that words on a page could produce this so-matic effect, which was in perfect synchrony with the gripping narra-tive. But the nausea and the admiration were pretty distinct; youcan’t savor a sensation and try to reduce it at the same time. This ex-ample qualifies as a co-existentialist episode in which the nausea andthe admiration are easily distinguished from one another.Here is a third example, which unfortunately requires first-handacquaintance for its impact: Rubens’ giant painting The feast of Herod(1633). It hangs in the National Gallery of Scotland in Edinburgh, and,given the immense size of the piece (208 x 264 cm), it more or lesshas to be hung in a position that places John the Baptist’s decapitatedhead in the range of adult eye-level. One immediately is confrontedwith a serving-platter holding a severed head, rendered in the green-ish-gray of putrefying flesh. Queen Herodias daintily sticks a fork intothe swollen protruding tongue as she casts a nasty smirk at her hus-band. If you have not been face to face with the original, it is hard to
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imagine the gut response this work induces. Definite queasiness. Butin this case, I – as well as other viewers with whom I have spoken –truly savored this sensation, returning to the image over and over tore-induce the uneasy stomach and the constriction of the throat itprompted. Not only a striking effect of the painter’s skill, this visceralresponse is an indispensable means of comprehending the horror ofthe terrible tale of revenge and the depth of meaning with which thegrisly theme is charged19. Of course, this is more than a simple ‘gutreaction’. It prompts reflection on the meaning and implication of theimage and its relation to the affective response it engenders. Appreci-ation and apprehension of art is often highly cognitive, by which I donot mean that we are instantly capable of formulating descriptivepropositions about a work. Insight can come in less articulate forms,among them the emotions induced by art – including disgust.I claim that in this case, the spasm of nausea and the savor – andby extension the disgust and the affective appreciation – are not onlyinseparable but one and the same. Not two components of apprecia-tion but one complex one. And not a complex one with distinguisha-ble elements that might be disassembled and examined separately,but one blended response that, should one try to separate its compo-nents, would lose its identity in some important way. The pause ofdisgust, as Kolnai describes it, not only permits but in this case ac-tually compels us to linger over the horrid image as well as the re-sponse it arouses, including a weirdly appreciative nausea.Although this case represents an exception to the general rulethat disgust engenders repulsion, with such examples in mind, wemight fine-tune our previous picture of emotions by regarding theirintentional objects as themselves components of emotional episodes,such that feeling quality varies accordingly. On this model, not onlydo emotions respond to objects with a typical qualitative feeling, butalso intentional objects reciprocate by tingeing the feeling quality ofthe emotion and filling-out the character of each emotion-event. Thispermits a high degree of variation for the experience of emotional ep-
19 Herodias commanded the head of John the Baptist as revenge for his criticism of her mar-riage to Herod. I thank Ivan Gaskell for informing me that Rubens alludes to St. Jerome’sclaim in Contra Rufinum that Herodias pierced John the Baptist’s tongue with a fork, just asFulvia had pierced Cicero’s tongue with a needle because she could not bear the truths hehad spoken (private correspondence).
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isodes. I posit that it sometimes allows aesthetic disgust to lose thecharacteristic impetus for recoil, permitting us to dwell within it andeven to savor its abhorrent nature. Granted, inserting intentional ob-jects into the identity of emotional episodes results in a somewhatunstable way to refer to emotions, since it emphasizes their degreesand variations rather than their common individual profiles. It is a ra-ther messy picture, philosophically speaking, and it willingly violatesmy least favorite theoretical principle: parsimony. Art and life arecomplicated and often overrun the elegance of principles. Betweenpreserving theoretical simplicity and recognizing the singular qualityof emotional responses to powerful works of art, I opt for the latter.
